Bind Configuration

[Michael Butash]

On 12/07/2014 10:42 PM, der.hans wrote:
> Am 07. Dez, 2014 schwätzte Michael Butash so:
>
>> You'll want to allow tcp/53 if doing any sort of public dns - 
>> anything greater than 1500 bytes (ie most domain-keys//spf records), 
>> and also any
>
> True, if you're doing those things, you might have large dns payloads and
> need tcp. If you think they cause problems rather than fixing them, then
> ...
"Normal" use of these yes, but imho better just to leave it be serviced 
anyways, especially if any sort of provider for others.
>
>> anomaly mitigation gear (the things that keep 400gb DDoS at bay) use 
>> that to
>
> What would anomaly mitigation gear be doing to cause large dns payloads?
> That's a serious question as I don't even know what anomaly mitigation
> gear is.
It's not a large payload issue, it's a method of them validating who is 
a script opening a raw udp socket to spew junk, etc vs. a "real" 
RFC-compliant client by sending that truncate bit back to the client, 
making them request via tcp, and thus doing something more than legit 
aiming a cannon.

Having worked for one of those large hosting companies that gets those 
300gb ddos attacks you read about (not to mention being responsible for 
dealing with them), you need something to do mitigate botnet blasts 
automagically, and luckily some smart people figure out protocol 
challenge behavioral hacks to do that.  I remember back in 2003 needing 
to open firewalls to allow tcp for our dns just for that alone when ddos 
became vogue among warring customers, but became more common at various 
other businesses to have to address allowing tcp as well for spf and others.

It also broke some remote providers that blocked tcp/53 as well for some 
reason when our devices couldn't "validate" them, adding them to a drop 
list vs. whitelisting them as "valid" clients.

Not that big a deal running a server at your house, and never using 
dkim/spf.  I think most default cisco asa firewall configs still filter 
udp dns protocol traffic by default over 512 too.
>
>> figure our if you're real or not. Blocking tcp for dns is not a good 
>> idea as a whole, it's just RFC-compliant behavior things expect.
>
> As I recall, the RFC only specifies tcp for large payloads. Don't allow
> them and tcp isn't necessary.
Less is more I suppose when talking firewalls, just know when you *do* 
need things like tcp-based dns.
>
> ciao,
>
> der.hans