PLUG February HackFest
Various important security daemon patches have
only recently been released including Bind9,
OpenSSL, cups & NTP for Ubuntu; Redhat5 Avahi (FC 10) and
SquirrelMail. So we will demonstrate exploits available for these
issues:
1) OpenSSL: (Using Debian)
http://www.metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/
Brute Forcing Tools Include:
http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/5622
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/debian_openssh_key_...
OpenSSL: Examples will also apply to the recent issues with OpenSSL:
Several functions inside OpenSSL incorrectly checked the result after
calling the EVP_VerifyFinal function, allowing a malformed signature
to be treated as a good signature rather than as an error. The issue
affected the signature checks on DSA and ECDSA keys used with
SSL/TLS for various mail systems and DNS systems built upon OpenSSL
also.
We will show an easy 'man in the middle' attack to present a malformed
SSL/TLS signature from a certificate chain
to a vulnerable client, bypassing validation and segway into a
discussion of the MD5 Verisign cert issues.
2) NTP Spoofing: (Using Debian) NTP Spoofing has been a staple of DoS
and remote root exploits since the 1990's. Usually NTP is selectively
allowed to egress DMZ via stateful packet inspection (that will catch
spoofed packets) via source and destination (or served via internal NTP
daemons). It's common to spoof the NTP servers while sending exploitive
packets.
A new issue has been identified:
http://www.debian.org/security/2009/dsa-1702
A simple exploit using netcat will be demonstrated:
http://cybexin.blogspot.com/2009/01/introduction-to-netcat.html
3) Overview of BEef:
http://www.bindshell.net/tools/beef
We
will also look at forensic image from the November Hackfest and discuss
ways to protect (arp, VPN/VLAN, Switches, SELINUX) from the inevitable
pwnership in a production or users desktop system.
We will not dissect squirrelmail, since it's only a XSS issue (similar
to 9 out of 10 running versions of Apache httpd in consumerland). We will not dissect
Bind9 because it also relates to the OpenSSL malformed signature. Other
PRNG type entropy issues with SSL exist, just waiting to be
popularlized, so we will wait for the industry to continue to ignore
this and other issues inherent in various protocols.