moin, moin, stripped ID info off just in case the person who sent this to me doesn't want it in public archives. This is a very important thing to post. Granted, the vulnerability this exploits was fixed in Jan and we're all keeping up on our security updates, right? At work I'm using autorpm against a local mirror of RH errata to keep stuff updated. Anyone know if autorpm will work for other RPM dists? How's Red Carpet working out? Mandrake has urpmi. How's that work for keeping security updates current? Does YaST have a mechanism to update security stuff? Anybody got slack script that watches the front pages of Freshmeat and automagically grabs anything that shows up there and is installed on the local system? ;-) The key for all of these is a mechanism to just grab security updates. I do this easily with debian similarly to how I can do apt-get, apt-test and apt-uns for the various releases. I presume any of the rpm things can work the same way as I'm working autorpm, e.g. local mirror of security updates, then use their upgrade tools against that. CAn the /ports stuff in *BSD differentiate between security updates and non-security updates? ciao, der.hans -- # der.hans@LuftHans.com home.pages.de/~lufthans/ www.YourCompanyHere.net ;-) # The only way for a woman to change a man # is if he's wearing Depends[TM] - der.hans ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001 11:02:27 -0700 To: der.hans@LuftHans.com Subject: Information from your old group.. der.hans: This came across our email and it may be of interest to PLUG members. I didn't know whether to post it, so rather than incur the wrath, I'm running it by you first. -----Original Message----- From: InfoSec Council-INFOSEC1 [mailto:InfoSec_Council-INFOSEC1@email.mot.com] Sent: Friday, March 23, 2001 9:52 AM To: 'infosec1@email.mot.com'; Coady Michael-cint81; Littwin Dale-RDMJ90; Jester Carl-o10434 Subject: FW: ALERT - A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET *********************************************************************** WARNING: THIS MESSAGE WAS SENT BY WAY OF THE MAILING LIST 'INFOSEC1'. REPLIES TO THIS MESSAGE WILL BE SENT TO ALL MEMBERS OF THIS LIST. FOR QUESTIONS OR ISSUES WITH THIS MAILING, CONTACT THE OWNER Paulette Hradnansky-G10014. *********************************************************************** %%%%% User P14017 (Mary Walker) posted the following message: We should be cognizant of this on any Linux machines we have running in an extranet environment. -----Original Message----- From: The SANS Institute [mailto:securityalert@sans.org] Sent: Friday, March 23, 2001 8:03 To: Mary Walker Subject: ALERT - A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET -----pgpenvelope processed message----- ALERT! A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET March 23, 2001 7:00 AM Late last night, the SANS Institute (through its Global Incident Analysis Center) uncovered a dangerous new worm that appears to be spreading rapidly across the Internet. It scans the Internet looking for Linux computers with a known vulnerability. It infects the vulnerable machines, steals the password file (sending it to a China.com site), installs other hacking tools, and forces the newly infected machine to begin scanning the Internet looking for other victims. Several experts from the security community worked through the night to decompose the worm's code and engineer a utility to help you discover if the Lion worm has affected your organization. Updates to this announcement will be posted at the SANS web site, http://www.sans.org DESCRIPTION The Lion worm is similar to the Ramen worm. However, this worm is significantly more dangerous and should be taken very seriously. It infects Linux machines running the BIND DNS server. It is known to infect bind version(s) 8.2, 8.2-P1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2-Px, and all 8.2.3-betas. The specific vulnerability used by the worm to exploit machines is the TSIG vulnerability that was reported on January 29, 2001. The Lion worm spreads via an application called "randb". Randb scans random class B networks probing TCP port 53. Once it hits a system, it checks to see if it is vulnerable. If so, Lion exploits the system using an exploit called "name". It then installs the t0rn rootkit. Once Lion has compromised a system, it: - Sends the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, as well as some network settings to an address in the china.com domain. - Deletes /etc/hosts.deny, eliminating the host-based perimeter protection afforded by tcp wrappers. - Installs backdoor root shells on ports 60008/tcp and 33567/tcp (via inetd, see /etc/inetd.conf) - Installs a trojaned version of ssh that listens on 33568/tcp - Kills Syslogd , so the logging on the system can't be trusted - Installs a trojaned version of login - Looks for a hashed password in /etc/ttyhash - /usr/sbin/nscd (the optional Name Service Caching daemon) is overwritten with a trojaned version of ssh. The t0rn rootkit replaces several binaries on the system in order to stealth itself. Here are the binaries that it replaces: du, find, ifconfig, in.telnetd, in.fingerd, login, ls, mjy, netstat, ps, pstree, top - "Mjy" is a utility for cleaning out log entries, and is placed in /bin and /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/. - in.telnetd is also placed in these directories; its use is not known at this time. - A setuid shell is placed in /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.x DETECTION AND REMOVAL We have developed a utility called Lionfind that will detect the Lion files on an infected system. Simply download it, uncompress it, and run lionfind. This utility will list which of the suspect files is on the system. At this time, Lionfind is not able to remove the virus from the system. If and when an updated version becomes available (and we expect to provide one), an announcement will be made at this site. Download Lionfind at http://www.sans.org/y2k/lionfind-0.1.tar.gz REFERENCES Further information can be found at: http://www.sans.org/current.htm http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html, CERT Advisory CA-2001-02, Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945 ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code http://www.sans.org/y2k/t0rn.htm Information about the t0rn rootkit. The following vendor update pages may help you in fixing the original BIND vulnerability: Redhat Linux RHSA-2001:007-03 - Bind remote exploit http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-007.html Debian GNU/Linux DSA-026-1 BIND http://www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-026 SuSE Linux SuSE-SA:2001:03 - Bind 8 remote root compromise. http://www.suse.com/de/support/security/2001_003_bind8_ txt.txt Caldera Linux CSSA-2001-008.0 Bind buffer overflow http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.0.txt http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.1.txt This security advisory was prepared by Matt Fearnow of the SANS Institute and William Stearns of the Dartmouth Institute for Security Technology Studies. The Lionfind utility was written by William Stearns. William is an Open-Source developer, enthusiast, and advocate from Vermont, USA. His day job at the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College pays him to work on network security and Linux projects. Also contributing efforts go to Dave Dittrich from the University of Washington, and Greg Shipley of Neohapsis Matt Fearnow SANS GIAC Incident Handler If you have additional data on this worm or a critical quetsion please email lionworm@sans.org