In case nobody has posted this yet: If you've not updated your bind/dns - do so NOW. Also, if you run bsd there is a chance the problem is there also. >Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001 9:40:03 -0700 (MST) >From: The SANS Institute >Subject: ALERT - A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET >Sender: sans@sans.org >To: John Driggers (SD512389) >X-LDAP-Alias: V 1.0rc5. Sent to driggers@slb.com resolving to >driggers@austin.apc.slb.com > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >ALERT! A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET > >March 23, 2001 7:00 AM > >Late last night, the SANS Institute (through its Global Incident >Analysis Center) uncovered a dangerous new worm that appears to be >spreading rapidly across the Internet. It scans the Internet looking >for Linux computers with a known vulnerability. It infects the >vulnerable machines, steals the password file (sending it to a >China.com site), installs other hacking tools, and forces the newly >infected machine to begin scanning the Internet looking for other >victims. > >Several experts from the security community worked through the night to >decompose the worm's code and engineer a utility to help you discover >if the Lion worm has affected your organization. > >Updates to this announcement will be posted at the SANS web site, >http://www.sans.org > > >DESCRIPTION > >The Lion worm is similar to the Ramen worm. However, this worm is >significantly more dangerous and should be taken very seriously. It >infects Linux machines running the BIND DNS server. It is known to >infect bind version(s) 8.2, 8.2-P1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2-Px, and all >8.2.3-betas. The specific vulnerability used by the worm to exploit >machines is the TSIG vulnerability that was reported on January 29, >2001. > >The Lion worm spreads via an application called "randb". Randb scans >random class B networks probing TCP port 53. Once it hits a system, it >checks to see if it is vulnerable. If so, Lion exploits the system using >an exploit called "name". It then installs the t0rn rootkit. > >Once Lion has compromised a system, it: > >- - Sends the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, as well as some >network settings to an address in the china.com domain. >- - Deletes /etc/hosts.deny, eliminating the host-based perimeter >protection afforded by tcp wrappers. >- - Installs backdoor root shells on ports 60008/tcp and 33567/tcp (via >inetd, see /etc/inetd.conf) >- - Installs a trojaned version of ssh that listens on 33568/tcp >- - Kills Syslogd , so the logging on the system can't be trusted >- - Installs a trojaned version of login >- - Looks for a hashed password in /etc/ttyhash >- - /usr/sbin/nscd (the optional Name Service Caching daemon) is >overwritten with a trojaned version of ssh. > >The t0rn rootkit replaces several binaries on the system in order to >stealth itself. Here are the binaries that it replaces: > >du, find, ifconfig, in.telnetd, in.fingerd, login, ls, mjy, netstat, >ps, pstree, top > >- - "Mjy" is a utility for cleaning out log entries, and is placed in /bin >and /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/. >- - in.telnetd is also placed in these directories; its use is not known >at this time. >- - A setuid shell is placed in /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.x > >DETECTION AND REMOVAL > >We have developed a utility called Lionfind that will detect the Lion >files on an infected system. Simply download it, uncompress it, and >run lionfind. This utility will list which of the suspect files is on >the system. > >At this time, Lionfind is not able to remove the virus from the system. >If and when an updated version becomes available (and we expect to >provide one), an announcement will be made at this site. > >Download Lionfind at http://www.sans.org/y2k/lionfind-0.1.tar.gz > > >REFERENCES > >Further information can be found at: > >http://www.sans.org/current.htm >http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html, CERT Advisory CA-2001-02, >Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND >http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945 ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow >in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code >http://www.sans.org/y2k/t0rn.htm Information about the t0rn rootkit. >The following vendor update pages may help you in fixing the original BIND >vulnerability: > >Redhat Linux RHSA-2001:007-03 - Bind remote exploit >http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-007.html >Debian GNU/Linux DSA-026-1 BIND >http://www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-026 >SuSE Linux SuSE-SA:2001:03 - Bind 8 remote root compromise. >http://www.suse.com/de/support/security/2001_003_bind8_ txt.txt >Caldera Linux CSSA-2001-008.0 Bind buffer overflow >http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.0.txt >http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.1.txt > >This security advisory was prepared by Matt Fearnow of the SANS >Institute and William Stearns of the Dartmouth Institute for Security >Technology Studies. > >The Lionfind utility was written by William Stearns. William is an >Open-Source developer, enthusiast, and advocate from Vermont, USA. His >day job at the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth >College pays him to work on network security and Linux projects. > >Also contributing efforts go to Dave Dittrich from the University of >Washington, and Greg Shipley of Neohapsis > >Matt Fearnow >SANS GIAC Incident Handler > >If you have additional data on this worm or a critical quetsion please >email lionworm@sans.org >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: GnuPG v1.0.4 (BSD/OS) >Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org > >iD8DBQE6u17n+LUG5KFpTkYRAgn9AJ0ffubakBA47teAe9lF92lrS2H+TwCgh3T/ >ek+YCliAS832nnMIzP28ezM= >=E1SG >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Rusty Carruth Email: rcarruth@Tempe.tt.slb.com or rcarruth@slb.com Voice: (480) 345-3621 SnailMail: Schlumberger ATE FAX: (480) 345-8793 7855 S. River Parkway, Suite 116 Ham: N7IKQ @ 146.82+,pl 162.2 Tempe, AZ 85284-1825 ICBM: 33 20' 44"N 111 53' 47"W