[Fwd: Re: [discuss] Upcoming OpenSSH vulnerability]

Mike plug-discuss@lists.plug.phoenix.az.us
Mon, 24 Jun 2002 21:56:25 -0500


Yes, OpenBSD has sshd running by default.
In fact, I have often wondered why they never included
something like "ALL:ALL" in a /etc/hosts.deny file.

v/r
Mike



On Mon, Jun 24, 2002 at 05:52:08PM -0700, Kyle O'Malley wrote:
 I cringe at the thought of upgrading sshd again (seems like I *just* did it for something with versions >3.1 iirc), and this time we're also adding a new user and directory (for priv seperation). Why does god hate us so.
 
 Hmm, can any openbsd users confirm if sshd is installed and running by default? Last time I used OBSD was 2.8, and if I remember it DID have it installed and running but that was while ago. If this is the case, could this spell the end of the "running x years without a remote exploit"?
 
 -Kyle
 
 On Mon, Jun 24, 2002 at 04:33:10PM -0700, KevinO wrote:
 > 
 > 
 > -------- Original Message --------
 > Subject: Re: [discuss] Upcoming OpenSSH vulnerability
 > Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 15:42:46 -0600
 > From: Vincent Danen <vdanen@mandrakesoft.com>
 > Reply-To: discuss@mandrakesecure.net
 > Organization: Danen Consulting Services (www.danen.net)
 > To: discuss@mandrakesecure.net
 > References: 
 > <Pine.A41.4.10.10206241520380.213388-100000@acs4.acs.ucalgary.ca>
 > 
 > On Mon Jun 24, 2002 at 03:21:24PM -0600, Daniel Woods wrote:
 > 
 > > FYI...
 > 
 > Updates are currently in the works.  The vulnerability, as stated is
 > not yet public.  I am close to having openssh built for all supported
 > platforms and just need to test them all now.
 > 
 > > Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 23:06:31 +0200
 > > From: Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
 > > Reply-To: openssh@openssh.com
 > > To: openssh-unix-announce@mindrot.org, openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
 > > Subject: [openssh-unix-announce] Re: Upcoming OpenSSH vulnerability
 > >
 > >
 > > On Mon, Jun 24, 2002 at 03:00:10PM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
 > > > Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2002 15:00:10 -0600
 > > > From: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org>
 > > > Subject: Upcoming OpenSSH vulnerability
 > > > To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
 > > > Cc: announce@openbsd.org
 > > > Cc: dsi@iss.net
 > > > Cc: misc@openbsd.org
 > > >
 > > > There is an upcoming OpenSSH vulnerability that we're working on with
 > > > ISS.  Details will be published early next week.
 > > >
 > > > However, I can say that when OpenSSH's sshd(8) is running with priv
 > > > seperation, the bug cannot be exploited.
 > > >
 > > > OpenSSH 3.3p was released a few days ago, with various improvements
 > > > but in particular, it significantly improves the Linux and Solaris
 > > > support for priv sep.  However, it is not yet perfect.  Compression is
 > > > disabled on some systems, and the many varieties of PAM are causing
 > > > major headaches.
 > > >
 > > > However, everyone should update to OpenSSH 3.3 immediately, and enable
 > > > priv seperation in their ssh daemons, by setting this in your
 > > > /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
 > > >
 > > > 	UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
 > > >
 > > > Depending on what your system is, privsep may break some ssh
 > > > functionality.  However, with privsep turned on, you are immune from
 > > > at least one remote hole.  Understand?
 > > >
 > > > 3.3 does not contain a fix for this upcoming bug.
 > > >
 > > > If priv seperation does not work on your operating system, you need to
 > > > work with your vendor so that we get patches to make it work on your
 > > > system.  Our developers are swamped enough without trying to support
 > > > the myriad of PAM and other issues which exist in various systems.
 > > > You must call on your vendors to help us.
 > > >
 > > > Basically, OpenSSH sshd(8) is something like 27000 lines of code.  A
 > > > lot of that runs as root.  But when UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled,
 > > > the daemon splits into two parts.  A part containing about 2500 lines
 > > > of code remains as root, and the rest of the code is shoved into a
 > > > chroot-jail without any privs.  This makes the daemon less vulnerable
 > > > to attack.
 > > >
 > > > We've been trying to warn vendors about 3.3 and the need for privsep,
 > > > but they really have not heeded our call for assistance.  They have
 > > > basically ignored us.  Some, like Alan Cox, even went further stating
 > > > that privsep was not being worked on because "Nobody provided any info
 > > > which proves the problem, and many people dont trust you theo" and
 > > > suggested I "might be feeding everyone a trojan" (I think I'll publish
 > > > that letter -- it is just so funny).  HP's representative was
 > > > downright rude, but that is OK because Compaq is retiring him.  Except
 > > > for Solar Designer, I think none of them has helped the OpenSSH
 > > > portable developers make privsep work better on their systems.
 > > > Apparently Solar Designer is the only person who understands the need
 > > > for this stuff.
 > > >
 > > > So, if vendors would JUMP and get it working better, and send us
 > > > patches IMMEDIATELY, we can perhaps make a 3.3.1p release on Friday
 > > > which supports these systems better.  So send patches by Thursday
 > > > night please.  Then on Tuesday or Wednesday the complete bug report
 > > > with patches (and exploits soon after I am sure) will hit BUGTRAQ.
 > > >
 > > > Let me repeat: even if the bug exists in a privsep'd sshd, it is not
 > > > exploitable.  Clearly we cannot yet publish what the bug is, or
 > > > provide anyone with the real patch, but we can try to get maximum
 > > > deployement of privsep, and therefore make it hurt less when the
 > > > problem is published.
 > > >
 > > > So please push your vendor to get us maximally working privsep patches
 > > > as soon as possible!
 > > >
 > > > We've given most vendors since Friday last week until Thursday to get
 > > > privsep working well for you so that when the announcement comes out
 > > > next week their customers are immunized.  That is nearly a full week
 > > > (but they have already wasted a weekend and a Monday).  Really I think
 > > > this is the best we can hope to do (this thing will eventually leak,
 > > > at which point the details will be published).
 > > >
 > > > Customers can judge their vendors by how they respond to this issue.
 > > >
 > > > OpenBSD and NetBSD users should also update to OpenSSH 3.3 right away.
 > > > On OpenBSD privsep works flawlessly, and I have reports that is also
 > > > true on NetBSD.  All other systems appear to have minor or major
 > > > weaknesses when this code is running.
 > > >
 > > > (securityfocus postmaster; please post this through immediately, since
 > > > i have bcc'd over 30 other places..)
 > > _______________________________________________
 > > openssh-unix-announce@mindrot.org mailing list
 > > http://www.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-announce
 > >
 > >
 > >
 > >
 > > For help, email discuss-help@mandrakesecure.net; to unsubscribe send a
 > > message to discuss-unsubscribe@mandrakesecure.net.  To visit 
 > MandrakeSecure,
 > > go to http://www.mandrakesecure.net/.
 > >
 > 
 > -- 
 > MandrakeSoft Security; http://www.mandrakesecure.net/
 > "lynx -source http://www.freezer-burn.org/bios/vdanen.gpg | gpg --import"
 > 1024D/FE6F2AFD   88D8 0D23 8D4B 3407 5BD7  66F9 2043 D0E5 FE6F 2AFD
 > 
 > Current Linux kernel 2.4.18-6.10mdk uptime: 16 days 17 hours 58 minutes.
 > 
 > 
 > -- 
 > Kevin O'Connor
 > 
 >  "People will be free to devote themselves to activities that are fun ...
 > 
 > The GNU Manifesto - Copyright (C) 1985, 1993 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
 
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