Fwd: ALERT - A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET
Shawn T. Rutledge
ecloud@bigfoot.com
Fri, 23 Mar 2001 17:38:10 -0700
Thank you! I saw something about it, but didn't realize I needed
to do something about it until now.
8.2.3-0 would be OK right? That's the latest one from
http://security.debian.org
On Fri, Mar 23, 2001 at 12:25:52PM -0700, Rusty Carruth wrote:
>
> In case nobody has posted this yet:
>
> If you've not updated your bind/dns - do so NOW.
>
> Also, if you run bsd there is a chance the problem is there also.
>
> >Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001 9:40:03 -0700 (MST)
> >From: The SANS Institute <securityalert@sans.org>
> >Subject: ALERT - A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET
> >Sender: sans@sans.org
> >To: John Driggers (SD512389) <driggers@slb.com>
> >X-LDAP-Alias: V 1.0rc5. Sent to driggers@slb.com resolving to
> >driggers@austin.apc.slb.com
> >
> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >Hash: SHA1
> >
> >ALERT! A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET
> >
> >March 23, 2001 7:00 AM
> >
> >Late last night, the SANS Institute (through its Global Incident
> >Analysis Center) uncovered a dangerous new worm that appears to be
> >spreading rapidly across the Internet. It scans the Internet looking
> >for Linux computers with a known vulnerability. It infects the
> >vulnerable machines, steals the password file (sending it to a
> >China.com site), installs other hacking tools, and forces the newly
> >infected machine to begin scanning the Internet looking for other
> >victims.
> >
> >Several experts from the security community worked through the night to
> >decompose the worm's code and engineer a utility to help you discover
> >if the Lion worm has affected your organization.
> >
> >Updates to this announcement will be posted at the SANS web site,
> >http://www.sans.org
> >
> >
> >DESCRIPTION
> >
> >The Lion worm is similar to the Ramen worm. However, this worm is
> >significantly more dangerous and should be taken very seriously. It
> >infects Linux machines running the BIND DNS server. It is known to
> >infect bind version(s) 8.2, 8.2-P1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2-Px, and all
> >8.2.3-betas. The specific vulnerability used by the worm to exploit
> >machines is the TSIG vulnerability that was reported on January 29,
> >2001.
> >
> >The Lion worm spreads via an application called "randb". Randb scans
> >random class B networks probing TCP port 53. Once it hits a system, it
> >checks to see if it is vulnerable. If so, Lion exploits the system using
> >an exploit called "name". It then installs the t0rn rootkit.
> >
> >Once Lion has compromised a system, it:
> >
> >- - Sends the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, as well as some
> >network settings to an address in the china.com domain.
> >- - Deletes /etc/hosts.deny, eliminating the host-based perimeter
> >protection afforded by tcp wrappers.
> >- - Installs backdoor root shells on ports 60008/tcp and 33567/tcp (via
> >inetd, see /etc/inetd.conf)
> >- - Installs a trojaned version of ssh that listens on 33568/tcp
> >- - Kills Syslogd , so the logging on the system can't be trusted
> >- - Installs a trojaned version of login
> >- - Looks for a hashed password in /etc/ttyhash
> >- - /usr/sbin/nscd (the optional Name Service Caching daemon) is
> >overwritten with a trojaned version of ssh.
> >
> >The t0rn rootkit replaces several binaries on the system in order to
> >stealth itself. Here are the binaries that it replaces:
> >
> >du, find, ifconfig, in.telnetd, in.fingerd, login, ls, mjy, netstat,
> >ps, pstree, top
> >
> >- - "Mjy" is a utility for cleaning out log entries, and is placed in /bin
> >and /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.
> >- - in.telnetd is also placed in these directories; its use is not known
> >at this time.
> >- - A setuid shell is placed in /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.x
> >
> >DETECTION AND REMOVAL
> >
> >We have developed a utility called Lionfind that will detect the Lion
> >files on an infected system. Simply download it, uncompress it, and
> >run lionfind. This utility will list which of the suspect files is on
> >the system.
> >
> >At this time, Lionfind is not able to remove the virus from the system.
> >If and when an updated version becomes available (and we expect to
> >provide one), an announcement will be made at this site.
> >
> >Download Lionfind at http://www.sans.org/y2k/lionfind-0.1.tar.gz
> >
> >
> >REFERENCES
> >
> >Further information can be found at:
> >
> >http://www.sans.org/current.htm
> >http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html, CERT Advisory CA-2001-02,
> >Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND
> >http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945 ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow
> >in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code
> >http://www.sans.org/y2k/t0rn.htm Information about the t0rn rootkit.
> >The following vendor update pages may help you in fixing the original BIND
> >vulnerability:
> >
> >Redhat Linux RHSA-2001:007-03 - Bind remote exploit
> >http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-007.html
> >Debian GNU/Linux DSA-026-1 BIND
> >http://www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-026
> >SuSE Linux SuSE-SA:2001:03 - Bind 8 remote root compromise.
> >http://www.suse.com/de/support/security/2001_003_bind8_ txt.txt
> >Caldera Linux CSSA-2001-008.0 Bind buffer overflow
> >http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.0.txt
> >http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.1.txt
> >
> >This security advisory was prepared by Matt Fearnow of the SANS
> >Institute and William Stearns of the Dartmouth Institute for Security
> >Technology Studies.
> >
> >The Lionfind utility was written by William Stearns. William is an
> >Open-Source developer, enthusiast, and advocate from Vermont, USA. His
> >day job at the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth
> >College pays him to work on network security and Linux projects.
> >
> >Also contributing efforts go to Dave Dittrich from the University of
> >Washington, and Greg Shipley of Neohapsis
> >
> >Matt Fearnow
> >SANS GIAC Incident Handler
> >
> >If you have additional data on this worm or a critical quetsion please
> >email lionworm@sans.org
> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >Version: GnuPG v1.0.4 (BSD/OS)
> >Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
> >
> >iD8DBQE6u17n+LUG5KFpTkYRAgn9AJ0ffubakBA47teAe9lF92lrS2H+TwCgh3T/
> >ek+YCliAS832nnMIzP28ezM=
> >=E1SG
> >-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> Rusty Carruth Email: rcarruth@Tempe.tt.slb.com or rcarruth@slb.com
> Voice: (480) 345-3621 SnailMail: Schlumberger ATE
> FAX: (480) 345-8793 7855 S. River Parkway, Suite 116
> Ham: N7IKQ @ 146.82+,pl 162.2 Tempe, AZ 85284-1825
> ICBM: 33 20' 44"N 111 53' 47"W
>
>
> ________________________________________________
> See http://PLUG.phoenix.az.us/navigator-mail.shtml if your mail doesn't post to the list quickly and you use Netscape to write mail.
>
> Plug-discuss mailing list - Plug-discuss@lists.PLUG.phoenix.az.us
> http://lists.PLUG.phoenix.az.us/mailman/listinfo/plug-discuss
--
_______ Shawn T. Rutledge / KB7PWD ecloud@bigfoot.com
(_ | |_) http://www.bigfoot.com/~ecloud kb7pwd@kb7pwd.ampr.org
__) | | \________________________________________________________________
Free long distance at http://www.bigredwire.com/me/RefTrack?id=USA063420